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Abstract: South America features a very particular regional architecture, one which is character-
ised by the proliferation and overlapping of regional organisations, with UNASUR at the centre. 
UNASUR is an intergovernmental organisation with no supranational institutions. The article will 
argue that institutional flexibility, which is both a core element of South American regionalism and 
a specific institutional feature of UNASUR, corresponds with the key interests of the founding mem-
bers of this organisation. Based on this assumption, the article will analyse the strategies and policies 
of the various Argentinean governments during the period when UNASUR was created (1999–
2008). It will differentiate between a ‘uniaxial’ regional integration approach structured around one 
thematic axis and a ‘multiaxial’ approach evolving along multiple axes in parallel; it will also ask to 
what extent the new regional architecture corresponds to the core interests of that country. For the 
Argentinean government, it was important to ensure that UNASUR would not constrain its foreign 
policy options. The result was the variable geometry codified in the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty.
Keywords: Regionalism; Integration; UNASUR; South America; Argentina.
Introduction
The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was first shaped by Brazil, and reflects 
Itamaraty’s own core interests and goals. While this interpretation is essentially correct, it 
parts from the assumption that the remaining eleven South American countries merely 
adapted their respective positions to what the government of Lula da Silva wanted to do in 
regional integration terms. This premise is empirically refutable. The road to the creation 
of UNASUR, and the factors that explain the form it ultimately took, were in fact much 
more complex than this.
Parting from an institutionalist perspective, UNASUR is interpreted as an organisa-
tion that contributes to regional segmentation. From this point of view, the South Ameri-
can countries’ inability to build solid regional institutions stimulates the creation of new 
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entities. As a new organisation responding to the Brazilian ambition of becoming a re-
gional leader, UNASUR reinforces the overlapping of regional organisations. Its entrance 
into a regional architecture already packed with institutions – such as OAS, MERCOSUR, 
Andean Community, Rio Group, or ALADI – generated friction both between and within 
them. It was thus a symptom of division, not of unity. ‘Asistimos a una sucesión de cum-
bres, tantas que parece una cordillera,’ complained the Chilean President Sebastián Piñera 
in 2011 (La Información 2011).
This article starts from an alternative point of view. From a political-strategic and 
foreign policy perspective, it considers UNASUR as an additional element in the South 
American regional architecture. The block was set up because twelve South American 
countries wanted it to happen. Both its institutional profile and agenda were the result of 
a collective decision being made. UNASUR was what the governments of the constituent 
member countries wanted it to be. All governments must have found something in that 
project that was of interest to them. Its formation was not a harmonious or linear process. 
On the contrary, it was a drawn out one characterised by moments of both convergence 
and divergence. UNASUR created an additional space for dialogue and co-operation 
within a system that had already provided several alternative arenas for action that vary 
according to the actors and issues areas involved.
In the Argentinean case, taking a political-strategic perspective makes sense. Not-
withstanding the fact that, from 1999 onward, the country’s various governments had 
been reluctant to support the South Americanisation of regional integration, in 2008 Presi-
dent Cristina Fernández de Kirchner still signed the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR. This 
did not happen because President Lula forced his counterpart to put pen to paper. On the 
contrary, it was the result of a long negotiation process in which the Argentinean gov-
ernment looked for guarantees that UNASUR’s institutional design and multiaxial profile 
would allow it to develop its own regional cooperation and integration agenda without 
major restrictions being placed on the definition of its foreign policy goals. With this deci-
sion, Argentina prioritised the likelihood that this new organisation would constitute an 
additional platform from which to influence the regional agenda. 
The article is divided into five sections. The first gives an overview of the debate over 
the proliferation and overlapping of regional organisations in Latin America. The second 
discusses the concept of regional integration. The third and fourth sections then analyse 
the chosen position and strategy of the Argentinean government in the formation and 
construction of the current regional architecture in South America, with a special focus 
on UNASUR and the interaction of this new South American organisation with other 
regional actors, organisations, and projects. Within these sections, the analysis will dif-
ferentiate between a ‘uniaxial’ and a ‘multiaxial’ regional integration approach.  A brief 
conclusion summarises to what extent the current regional architecture in South America 
can be said to reflect the interests and foreign policy priorities of Argentina. While UN-
ASUR is perceived as an additional regional forum for cooperation on issue areas such as 
defence, infrastructure, health, science and technology, or finance, MERCOSUR is still the 
cornerstone of Argentina’s regional integration strategy. 
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Segmented regionalism versus institutional flexibility 
Most world regions feature more than one regional organisation. Often, these organisa-
tions are complementary and perform different functions. Some are sub-organisations of 
other or wider-ranging regional organisations. However, regional organisations can also 
overlap with regard to their mandates and constituent members (for Africa, see Genna 
and De Lombaerde 2010; for Latin America, Malamud 2013; Weiffen et al. 2013; Mal-
amud and Gardini 2012). The proliferation and overlapping of regional organisations is 
frequently described and symbolised by invoking the metaphor of a spaghetti bowl. Such 
spaghetti concoctions are dished up by scholars in African, Asian, Latin American, and 
even European bowls. 
As to the Latin American spaghetti bowl, both the proliferation and the overlapping 
of regional organisations, as well the possible consequences thereof, have been broadly 
discussed. One group of analysts – best represented by Malamud and Gardini (2012) – 
take a very critical view of this. They state that ‘the presence of segmented and overlap-
ping regionalist projects is not a manifestation of successful integration but, on the con-
trary, signals the exhaustion of its potential’ (Malamud and Gardini 2012: 117). In their 
opinion, the multiple memberships of states in different (sub)regional organisations will 
invariably create friction between and within regional integration projects – and thus will 
ultimately fuel division instead of unity in the region. Moreover, as Gómez-Mera (2015: 
20) indicates, ‘by introducing legal fragmentation and rule ambiguity, regime complexity 
has exacerbated implementation and compliance problems in Latin American regional 
cooperation initiatives.’
Figure 1: UNASUR – Organisational perspective
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
548  vol. 38(2) May/Aug 2016 Nolte & Comini
While Malamud and Gardini (2012) and Gómez-Mera (2015) focus on the risks re-
lated to the proliferation and overlapping of regional organisations in Latin America, for 
other authors (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012; Tussie 2009; Sanahuja 2010) it is still not clear 
how the regional architecture will evolve and what the emergence of a multifaceted pat-
tern of overlapping regional organisations and projects will come to imply. ‘The trend may 
be not towards amalgamation or a single converged regional bloc, but towards greater 
diversity of hybrids with mutually fuzzy boundaries, arranging component pieces in ever 
new combinations underpinned by increasingly intense regional relations’ (Tussie 2009: 
185–186). 
From another perspective, one based on European experiences – and taken originally 
without any reference to Latin America – Hofmann and Mérand argue in favour of dif-
ferentiated multilateral cooperation and ‘institutional elasticity’, which can foster peaceful 
and stable interstate relations within a region and minimise the risk of zero-sum politics 
unfolding. In their view, ‘outright bargaining failures become less likely as member states 
have the flexibility to opt out of certain institutionalised policy domains or they can push 
for their preferred policy preferences in another institution’ (Hofmann and Mérand 2012: 
134–135). The authors refer to a European-style variable geometry, where no state ‘feels 
forced to belong to the entire club, and hence is more willing to invest in the policy areas 
that are close to its interests’ (Hofmann and Mérand 2012: 137).
This concept can also be applied to Latin America. Sanahuja (2010: 110) emphasises 
the point that the Constitutive Treaty (Article 13) of UNASUR explicitly opens up the pos-
sibility of a variable geometry-type architecture being constituted in South America. Chil-
ean Foreign Minister Heraldo Muñoz explicitly mentioned the concept of a ‘multispeed 
Europe’ (‘el concepto de la Unión Europea de las “velocidades diferenciadas”’) in one of his 
first public declarations in 2014. 
The proliferation and overlapping of regional organisations are phenomena closely in-
terconnected. The question of why regional organisations overlap is related to that of why 
new regional organisations are created and/or of why they later expand their mandate. 
Why do states/governments create or join a (new) regional organisation? They do this es-
sentially because they think that they can benefit from their membership in it, or because 
they want to avoid any expected negative externalities of not being a member. They join 
different organisations because these bodies are focused on varying topics and because 
they create more arenas for their strategic projects to be realised in. In Latin America/
South America most regional organisations were first created to promote new regional 
projects or objectives that had not yet been realised by the existing regional organisations. 
They were reactions to new challenges (or the zeitgeist), such as the expansion of integra-
tion schemes in different world regions in the 1990s or the emergence of a new economic 
paradigm (for example ‘open regionalism’). Regional organisations are newly created and 
survive when they serve the conflicting strategic interests of the various state actors in-
volved in them (Hurrell 1998).
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Figure 2: UNASUR – Political Outlook
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
Because of the competition and overlapping of regional organisations, it makes no 
sense to look at them in isolation, ‘thus neglecting the specific properties of an institu-
tional architecture (that is, how different regional organisations are assembled together) 
and the impact that these properties have on regional order’ (Hofmann and Mérand 2012: 
133–134). In the end, the whole architecture – that is, the combination and interaction of 
different regional organisations in Latin America – is more important than its parts – that 
is, individual regional organisations. As will be appreciated in the analysis of the Argentin-
ean support to UNASUR, focusing on one isolated regional organisation might lead to in-
accurate conclusions about the state of regional integration. Consequently, it makes more 
sense to discuss the entire regional architecture rather than to investigate separate regional 
organisations. In this vein, Van Langenhove (2012: 26) persuasively argues in favour of 
widening the research agenda on regional integration, with the objective of directing at-
tention to the study of intraregional processes, because ‘unlike states regions and regional 
arrangements can overlap. This has consequences for regional integration as several of 
such processes may occur simultaneously in a given geographic area.’
Regionalism is what actors make of it 
In the studies on regional integration, very often an approach predominates that evalu-
ates the newly created regional organisations only with regard to their coherence and ef-
ficiency – and whether they correspond or not to a pre-established model of integration 
(specifically, that of the European Union). This approach is inherently flawed, because the 
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institutional design of a particular regional organisation reflects the interests and strate-
gies of its founding members. What may be dysfunctional from a purely organisational 
viewpoint may be functional from the standpoint of the member states (or some of the 
member states at least). In a similar way, one has to address the fact that many regional 
organisations overlap with regard to their constituent members and/or mandates. What 
might be a problem from an organisational perspective can actually create room for stra-
tegic action by the individual member states. In general, for the member states the over-
lapping of regional organisations is not a problem – quite the contrary, it creates the op-
portunity for cross-institutional political strategies to be pursued.
Sanahuja (2012: 25) writes that through UNASUR ‘the aspirations of Latin Ameri-
can regional integration are redefined in a South American geographical and ideational 
framework.’ Regions and regional projects are historically contingent and changing social 
constructs. There is not one prefabricated model of what constitutes a region. Critics of 
Latin American regionalism often start with a narrow definition of regional integration, 
or lambast Latin American governments for failing to deliver something that they never 
actually promised or aspired to creating in the first place. 
Alluding to the title of Alexander Wendt’s famous work, Riggirozzi and Tussie (2012: 
3) write that a ‘region is what actors make of it.’ This article shares the outlook that one 
should take seriously the statements, declarations, and proposals of the actors involved in 
regional projects, and furthermore should not ask for the delivery of goods never prom-
ised by those participating in them – in our case, Latin American governments. However, 
there is a major bias to be found in many recent analyses of current Latin American re-
gionalism. These start first with a preconceived notion of what regionalism should be, and 
normally end up advocating a narrow model of European-style integration that includes 
strong supranational institutions and the transfer of sovereignty. For example, Malamud 
and Gardini (2012: 130) posit that ‘Latin American states continue to establish regional 
organisations because their leaders know that sovereignty is not relinquished by signing 
papers. Rather, regionalism is a foreign policy resource used to achieve other ends such 
as international visibility, regional stability and regime legitimacy.’ One might ask what is 
problematic about these self-declared goals; seemingly, their only ‘flaw’ is that they do not 
correspond to the EU model. 
Although the European experience of regional integration is unique, many authors 
often take that continent as the ‘gold standard’ of regional integration (Sbragia 2008: 33). 
Subsequently, they come to the unsurprising conclusion that regional experiences outside 
of Europe do not constitute genuine integration. A good example of this approach is the 
article by Andrés Malamud and Schmitter, who start with the statement that they under-
stand integration in European terms as a process in which nation-states voluntarily min-
gle, merge, and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty. 
Further, they argue ‘that they do so by creating common and permanent institutions ca-
pable of making decisions binding on all members’ (Malamud and Schmitter 2011: 143). 
From this perspective, CAN and Mercosur have made little progress towards integration. 
Both authors are strictly against a softening or changing of the definition of regional in-
tegration because they fear an overextension (conceptual stretching) of the term. In their 
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view, ‘regional integration should be conceptually differentiated from simple, that is, un-
institutionalised and usually erratic, regional cooperation or collaboration’ (Malamud 
and Schmitter 2011: 143). There seems to be a very strong bias here against all kinds of 
regional integration and cooperation that do not strictly resemble the European patterns. 
Consequently, Malamud and Schmitter (2011: 143) disagree that there might be ‘a distinc-
tive “Latin American” (or, for that matter, “Asian” or “African”) pattern of integration that 
may not resemble the European ‘institutional” one, but nevertheless is capable of resolving 
regional problems, asserting regional cohesion and building regional identity.’ 
Some Latin American authors however articulate a totally different vision of integra-
tion. In the view of the Argentinean economist Aldo Ferrer (2013), the key to successful 
integration does not rest in the delegation of sovereignty to supranational communitarian 
institutions. For him, the experience of the EU demonstrates that the concession of sover-
eignty results in the subordination of the weaker member states to the hegemonic power 
of the stronger ones. Therefore he argues in favour of an integration that is not based on 
the transfer of sovereignty, but rather in the solidary construction of sovereignty – a state 
of being that is still missing for many Latin American states in certain issue areas. Thus for 
Ferrer, integration consists in the complementation and extension of national sovereign-
ties. For Van Langenhove (2012: 20), meanwhile, ‘regions can take over or complement 
state actorness.’ 
Public opinion surveys conducted in the region to date have corroborated the prefer-
ence for a uniquely Latin American form of integration; people there are not interested in 
the creation of supranational institutions and in relinquishing sovereignty. In general, Bra-
zilians, Chileans, Colombians, Ecuadorians, Peruvians, and Mexicans do not place great 
importance on the promotion of regional integration as a foreign policy objective (Mal-
donado 2012). Rising powers such as Brazil, China, India, and South Africa do not pro-
mote an EU-type model of regional integration (Fawcett 2013). Also, regional secondary 
powers such as Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela (in the case of South America), are 
not keen to relinquish sovereignty rights. Against the will of these countries and without 
their participation, it would be impossible to create this kind of institution in their cor-
responding regions. One should also mention that the euro crisis has seen the EU become 
a less attractive role model. Furthermore, the EU has also demonstrated that a risk exists 
of estrangement between the citizens of member states and the supranational institutions 
governing them. One should not forget that integration is not an end in itself; its success 
and institutional arrangements depend on the interests of the participating states and of 
those states’ citizens. The EU is thus not always seen as the global benchmark for integra-
tion processes.
Starting from this broader vision of Latin American regionalism, in the next sec-
tions the paper analyses the position and strategy of the Argentinean government in the 
formation and construction of the current regional architecture in South America, with 
a special focus on UNASUR and the interaction of this new South American organisa-
tion with other regional actors, organisations, and projects. To what extent, then, does 
the current regional architecture in South America reflect the interests and foreign policy 
priorities of Argentina? There is a predominant view among academics (Amoroso Botelho 
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2008; Luchetti 2015; Botto 2015) that Argentina supported from the very beginning the 
creation of UNASUR. In fact, this was not the case. There is another such perspective that 
advances the idea of Argentina’s ‘subordination’ in this context to Brazil’s interests (Merke 
2009; Bernal-Meza 2008; Miranda 2015); the reality, however, does not accurately reflect 
that interpretation either. Finally, they are those scholars who emphasise Argentinean re-
sistance to the UNASUR project (Daudelin and Burges 2011). 
Nevertheless, all these interpretations miss the point that the official Argentinean po-
sition was not consistent, uniform, or linearly evolving; on the contrary, it was dynamic, 
characterised by twists and turns, by moments of tension, and especially by a relatively 
enduring tendency to distrust the South Americanisation project. The analysis here will be 
focused on the period 1999–2008, being divided into two sub-periods: one extending from 
the accession to power of the Alianza para el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación (Alianza) 
up until the last days of Eduardo Duhalde’s government (1999–2003), the other spanning 
the time from the beginning of the presidency of Néstor Kirchner up until the signature of 
the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR (2003–2008). Notwithstanding government changes, 
during the whole period the South American project was neither the priority nor the first 
choice of the Argentinean government. With that in mind, why did it finally consent to the 
creation of UNASUR? In the next section an answer will be given to this riddle. 
Rejecting the South American option in a uniaxial period
The analysis starts with the 1999–2003 sub-period. It will be structured along the four 
conceptual dimensions that characterise and capture Argentinean foreign policy at this 
time: uniaxiality, crisis, South Americanisation, and domestic–foreign policy boundaries.
Uniaxiality. At the beginning of this period, Argentina’s regional priority was the 
Southern Common Market (Mercosur), and it was characterised by an approach one 
might describe as ‘uniaxial’ . This kind of integration process approach is structured 
around one thematic axis, from which spillover effects to other areas are to be expected. 
The economic–commercial axis marked both the orientation of Mercosur and the foreign 
policy of Argentina. Of course, this integration approach did not inhibit other topics from 
being put onto the regional agenda. It is also important to emphasise that economics can-
not be separated from politics. The economic uniaxial design of Mercosur was the result 
of the decisions taken by member countries, choices that expressed their priorities with 
regard to the regional agenda and the legal and institutional architecture of that block. 
The focus on the economic axis was so pronounced that Argentinean Minister of Finance 
Domingo Cavallo once argued that ‘está agotado el modelo de relacionamiento comercial 
con países que se dan el lujo de hacer lo que quieren con sus monedas’ (Clarín 2001: 27 
October). Despite some progress made over the definition of common positions between 
the various Mercosur countries,1 Cavallo reduced regionalism to essentially short-term 
negotiations on trade and financial, especially debt-related, issues. Changing this orienta-
tion required attendant political will and the multidimensional crisis that culminated in 
2001,2 which created a demand for political change. 
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Crisis. Between 1999 and 2003 a vicious circle existed between the internal crisis and 
intraregional discrepancies, circumstances that were also influenced by the behavioural 
choices of extra-regional actors. This led the Argentinean government to take a new look 
at several issues, among them regional integration. This scenario was propitious for a re-
consideration of Mercosur’s uniaxial orientation. However the ways in which the recon-
ceptualisation of regional integration was proposed were not uniform in nature. Differ-
ent actors attempted to impose their own divergent visions, leading to a process full of 
marches and counter-marches, convergences and divergences. The result of this was that 
during this period diverse approaches to how to broaden and deepen regional linkages 
emerged side-by-side.
In this regard, the discussion that took place about what the best strategy would be 
for relaunching Mercosur is quite illustrative. Concepts such as ‘regeneration’, ‘new com-
mitment’, or ‘change’ were used sometimes as synonyms, sometimes also as antonyms, in 
the speeches given at the time by members of the Argentinean political elite. Different 
politicians embellished these concepts with their own specific ideational content. In 1999, 
former president Carlos Menem argued that taking the path towards a single currency was 
vital for regional integration. He identified the United States dollar as the ideal common 
currency. In his words, dollarisation would benefit ‘la gente’ (La Nación 1999: 2 January). 
In early January 2000, meanwhile, Beatriz Nofal, Member of Parliament from the 
Alianza, emphasised the need for a new political commitment by the parties to achieve 
integration. However, her proposed recipes continued to focus on the economic agenda: 
the guarantee of free intra-Mercosur trade, compliance with the common external tariff, 
harmonisation of regional tax incentives, settlement of commercial disputes, and better 
macro-economic co-ordination (La Nación 2000: 2 January). Years later, and following 
this line of argumentation, a former minister of foreign affairs emphasised that in the 
context of pronounced Brazilian protectionism ‘el relanzamiento del Mercosur tenía, para 
mí, una especificidad que era un mayor equilibrio de mercado’ (Interviewee 1 2014). After 
Lula da Silva was elected as the new president of Brazil in 2002, Duhalde’s minister of for-
eign affairs, Carlos Ruckauf, declared that ‘[l]as puertas del mundo podrán abrirse para el 
Mercosur gracias a la vocación por la unión aduanera del sur que demuestra el presidente 
electo brasileño Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’ (Clarín 2002: 28 November). A former Argen-
tinean President stated, some time afterwards, that the relaunch should have gone in the 
direction of an imitation of European institutions: ‘[T]eníamos que crear las estructuras 
que ya tenía la Unión Europea’ (Interviewee 2 2014).
 South Americanisation. Concurrent with the Argentinean crisis, and while search-
ing for the appropriate channels through which to reconfigure Mercosur, Brazil launched 
once more its proposal to create a South American organisation. The official Argentinean 
positions regarding this initiative ranged from disinterest to giving a lukewarm and un-
specified commitment to it. The South American Summit held in Brasilia in 2000 was 
illustrative of this Argentinean ambivalence. On that occasion, the De la Rúa government 
was overtly reticent about endorsing an integration path that excluded other states of geo-
strategic importance such as Mexico or the United States.3 Because Mexico was not invit-
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ed, the Argentinean Ministry of Foreign Affairs delayed the confirmation of its country’s 
participation in the summit meeting. The Argentinean foreign minister even requested 
an exclusive meeting of the ‘group of four’ (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico) prior to 
the summit. The deliberate exclusion of Mexico was perceived by many within the Argen-
tinean government as being a part of Itamaraty’s strategy for strengthening Brazil’s own 
position as the regional leader. 
For that reason, the Argentinean government preferred a variable geometry of re-
gional integration – supporting, inter alia, the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional 
Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) and the establishment of a subcontinental free 
trade area complementary to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), to be realised 
by 2002. This was in line with the country’s foreign policy priorities: Mercosur and the 
FTAA. The Argentinean representatives rejected any initiative that would necessitate 
making strong institutional and political commitments. This was the case when Venezu-
elan President Hugo Chávez proposed creating a South American confederation, with the 
objective of advancing from an essentially economic integration scheme towards a specifi-
cally political regional project. However, Argentina was not the only country that rejected 
the Venezuelan plan: the main opponent to it was Brazilian president Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, who argued that the Rio Group already existed to deal with regional political is-
sues, and that it did not make sense to have two forums addressing the same topics (Folha 
de São Paulo 2000: 2 September).
This constellation was no different in 2002 either, when the second South Ameri-
can presidential summit took place in Guayaquil. This meeting was characterised by the 
participation of many weak or lame duck governments, and by the absence of some key 
presidents. At the summit, the Duhalde government expressed its intention to advance 
with the South Americanisation of regional integration. It signed the Guayaquil Consen-
sus on Integration, Security, and Infrastructure for Development, which, while expanding 
the regional agenda, was essentially only a declamatory document in practice. However, 
the Duhalde Administration was a government by default, with low legitimacy both in-
ternally and externally. In fact, when it had the chance to support specific regional public 
policies, it voted against these initiatives. The Argentinean representatives vetoed projects 
such as the creation of an International Humanitarian Fund (IHF) – conceived of as a 
counterbalance to the IMF – and the formation of  an organisation  of South American 
oil-producing countries (El País 2002: 30 September). All of these measures had originally 
been proposed by Venezuela. 
Domestic–foreign policy boundaries. Argentina’s position in regard to Mercosur and to 
the South Americanisation proposal was shifting and incoherent at the time, because this 
was a period full of political and economic turbulences. Governments changed frequently, 
and so did the relationships between them and both external and internal actors. It is diffi-
cult to maintain a consistent official position when the foreign and domestic environment 
is in flux. The governments of both De la Rúa and Duhalde were restrained by external 
stakeholders, which contributed to the intensification of the national crisis. The global 
financial crisis and the complicated relations with foreign governments – especially with 
Spain and the US, as leading investors in the country – and with international financial 
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institutions – such as the IMF, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank – de-
fined Argentina’s political priority at the time as being ‘do not implode.’
External pressures interacted with internal dynamics, affecting and restricting the 
availability of Argentinean foreign policy options during this critical period. Intergovern-
mental bickering and government–opposition conflicts were of particular relevance here. 
From 1999 to 2003, the policy with regard to Mercosur and the South American alterna-
tive was conditioned above all by domestic politics. Over time, divergences and tensions 
about how to position Argentina in relation to these projects emerged both within the 
government and among the opposition as well. Within this process, the positions were 
often antagonistic. This was visible within the Alianza, due to the polarisation between 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Rodríguez Giavarini and Minister of Finance Cavallo. Rodrí-
guez Giavarini defended the pursuing of a ‘concentric’ strategy, starting from the basis of a 
strong alliance formed with Brazil, in order to strengthen Mercosur and to ensure Argen-
tina’s immersion into the world at large through this regional alliance.
In contrast, Cavallo advocated taking a very light variable geometry approach, while 
co-ordination through Mercosur would ideally be minimal and flexible. ‘Lo mejor es se-
guir la vía chilena: negociaciones bilaterales en frente múltiples,’ he argued in 2001 (Clarín 
2001: 7 May). There were multiple and diverse options and formulas proposed for Ar-
gentina’s international position. The country should not be restrained by the Mercosur. 
A similar situation arose during the years of the Duhalde Administration, when Foreign 
Minister Ruckauf was very critical of Brazil. Less than two years before he assumed this 
position, he had even asked for the suspension of the Asuncion Treaty (La Nación 2000: 
15 March). On the other hand, the president was an advocate of the bilateralisation of 
regional integration – based on the assumption that Argentina and Brazil were Mercosur’s 
heartbeat – as an initial step towards further improvement in the relationships with other 
Latin America countries. 
Sectorial demands and pressures fuelled and reinforced these intragovernmental dis-
crepancies. During this period, economic conflicts evolved in sectors such as those of live-
stock, agriculture, textiles, and the automobile industry, which involved interest groups, 
private companies, trade unions, and social and political actors. These conflicts put pres-
sure on Argentina’s uniaxial agenda, and had a negative impact on the country’s relations 
within the region. 
Multiaxial paths: From divergence to convergence
While until 2003 mistrust had characterised Argentina’s position with regard to the South 
American vision, one can in fact assert that, from then up until 2008, the situation did 
not substantially change either. It is true that in 2008 President Cristina Fernández signed 
UNASUR’s Constitutive Treaty, but this decision stood at the end of a complicated process 
– one with many ups and downs, as well as conflicts and tensions, in the relationship be-
tween Argentina and Brazil. As in the previous section, the analysis is organised according 
to four dimensions that mark the general tendencies in Argentinean foreign policy at the 
556  vol. 38(2) May/Aug 2016 Nolte & Comini
time: multiaxiality, the erosion of uniaxiality, South Americanisation, and domestic–foreign 
policy boundaries.
Multiaxiality. This concept characterises integration processes that evolve along mul-
tiple axes in parallel. The involved governments do not privilege one central axis, but rather 
prefer to advance simultaneously in several different areas. These often include trade and 
financial cooperation, but can also involve such domains as poverty reduction, the fight 
against social exclusion and marginalisation, the eradication of hunger, the improvement 
of health services and of education, as well as cooperation over defence and security is-
sues. In the multiaxial model, the integration process does not necessarily always advance 
along the same axes, simultaneously, or with the same intensity and speed. The article will 
demonstrate how between 2003 and 2008 the Argentinean government preferred a mul-
tiaxial approach, with this being true both when it negotiated over the future of Mercosur 
and during the creation of UNASUR.
The erosion of uniaxiality. Argentina played an active role in the striving for a multiax-
ial Mercosur. This can be substantiated primarily on the discursive level, through the wit-
nessed promotion of ideas such as a ‘Mercosur reforzado’ during the time of the Duhalde 
Administration (Clarín 2003: 5 February) or a ‘Mercosur abarcativo’ (La Nación 2003: 19 
June) in the Kirchner years. During the 2003 presidential campaign, Néstor Kirchner had 
raised this argument with the objective of differentiating himself from Carlos Menem with 
regard to the international immersion of Argentina: via his party platform he asserted that 
the consolidation of Mercosur would be a priority of his government if elected. With this 
objective in mind, between 2003 and 2008 both he and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
endorsed a wide range of projects that made the block more multiaxial in nature. 
Several examples exist of how the Argentinean government was now actively promot-
ing a multiaxial regional integration scheme: the promulgation of the ‘2006 Objective’, 
with 32 thematic areas and the inclusion of topics related to commercial, financial, insti-
tutional, industrial, military, police, social, or energy issues; the ‘Buenos Aires Consensus’, 
an expression of the Argentinean–Brazilian bilateralisation of Mercosur (with 22 con-
stituent points, encompassing issues in areas such as education, health, social inclusion, 
science and technology, culture, and environment); and, the ‘Work Program 2004–2006’, 
designed with the objectives in mind of an ‘economic-trade Mercosur’, a ‘social Mercosur’, 
an ‘institutional Mercosur’, and a ‘new integration agenda’. Likewise, the Argentinean gov-
ernment repeatedly pressed for a more solid and entrenched Mercosur. In that direction, 
it supported such measures to further institutionalise the regional integration scheme as: 
the rules of procedure of the Political Consultation and Coordination Forum; the regulation 
of the Olivos Protocol for the settlement of disputes; the Permanent Review Tribunal for 
Dispute Settlement; the Commission of Permanent Representatives; and the MERCOSUR 
Parliament. It also emphasised the necessity of looking ahead and thinking about future 
projects, which were expected to range from the creation of a common currency, a Re-
gional Monetary Institute, a Social Institute, a Democracy Observatory, a fund to finance 
the education sector, and a Bank of the South to a ‘Gran Gasoducto del Sur’.4
Moreover, during this period, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela 
articulated a strong position against the FTAA, a uniaxial regional integration project un-
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der the United States’ leadership. This attitude was explicitly visible in 2005 during the 4th 
Summit of the Americas in Buenos Aires. In the words of a former Argentinean minister 
of foreign affairs, this was a ‘historical day (in Spanish ‘día histórico’). Some interpreta-
tions focus on the ideological rupture as one of the relevant factors that paralysed the 
FTAA negotiations (Nelson 2015). It was indeed a key factor. In the opinion of the former 
Argentinean minister, ‘el fin del ALCA’ (buried during the Buenos Aires summit) ‘es el 
comienzo de la Unasur.’ Nevertheless, according to him, the main reasons for the rupture 
were associated with commercial interests, especially with the fact that United States is a 
huge food exporter. From this perspective, the US represented ‘un competidor natural’ for 
Argentina, he said (Interviewee 1 2014). 
South Americanisation. Parallel to its endeavours towards the multiaxialisation of Mer-
cosur, Argentina also supported that body’s enlargement. This was noticeable when in 
2003 Argentina supported the associated membership of Peru, as well as the negotiation 
of a free trade agreement with the Andean Community (which was formalised in 2005). 
Moreover in 2006, the Protocol of Accession of Venezuela was signed. Thus, between 2003 
and 2008 Argentina promoted the expansion of Mercosur through the inclusion of differ-
ent states in it, some with the status of associated members – such as Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Peru – while others – such as Venezuela – sought to become incorporated 
as full members.
However, while Argentina promoted the consolidation of a multiaxial, deeper, and 
broader Mercosur, the proposal to establish a new South American regional organisation 
also progressed. There were certain moments when the Argentinean government open-
ly supported this initiative. This was the case when the logic of Argentinean–Brazilian 
regional bilateralism prevailed, as during the Mercosur summit in Montevideo 2003, at 
which President Kirchner referred to the construction of a South America with one voice 
(La Nación 2003: 16 December). This happened again in 2006, in the time period between 
the meeting of the South American Community of Nations (CSN) in Brasilia and the 
Mercosur summit in Córdoba, Argentina. Argentina’s support for the South American op-
tion was directly associated with the country’s honeymoon periods with Brazil. When the 
relations between both governments flourished, Itamaraty’s dream of regionalizing inte-
gration – with the objective of including all South American countries – often received the 
backing of the Argentinean authorities. There were several situations in which Argentina 
ended up backing the institutionalisation of the South America project: this was explicitly 
the case during the 2004 Cusco summit – when the constitution of the CSN was initiated 
– and during the 2008 presidential summit in Brasilia – when both governments signed 
the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty.
Beyond these positive signals given, however, there was still reluctance on the Ar-
gentinean side to fully endorse the South America project. Argentina’s enlargement per-
spective for Mercosur was not limited to South America. Even when the Argentinean 
government distanced itself temporarily from countries such as Cuba or Mexico, this did 
not imply that it had also renounced its Latin American vision for an enlarged Mercosur. 
After intensive fieldwork5 investigating the Argentinean government’s position, it can be 
confirmed that South Americanisation was generally interpreted by the Argentinean au-
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thorities as a shoe made for Brazilian feet. From this perspective, the South America proj-
ect would in fact contribute to the further isolation of countries such as Cuba – and to the 
permanent exclusion of other countries from the bargaining table too, ones that, as in the 
case of Mexico, might become counterweights to Brazil. Therefore, Argentina supported 
the Cuba–Venezuela alliance, the origin of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our 
America (ALBA). This alternative regional project was perceived not only as a rejection 
of the contents and purposes of the FTAA (Kellogg 2007) but also as a way to overcome 
Cuba’s isolation (ALBA 2004) 
‘Lo que te quiero decir es que la posición de Argentina... era de no entusiasmo, pero 
de acompañar,’ explained a former high-ranking member of the Argentinean Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs regarding the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty negotiation. From his point of 
view, Itamaraty’s intention of achieving a permanent seat for Brazil in the United Nations 
Security Council aroused suspicion at the time. He argued that, for Brazil, ‘el negocio de 
UNASUR era sudamericanizar la región con un proyecto a 10, 15 o 20 años para cuando 
negocie su ingreso al Consejo de Seguridad.’ This would be an excellent opportunity for 
Brazil to present itself as ‘yo soy Sudamérica’ (Interviewee 3 2014). ‘A nosotros nos resul-
taba poco natural un recorte sudamericano, para nosotros el recorte era América Latina, 
ese era nuestro recorte donde nos sentíamos cómodos,’ added later another important 
Argentinean negotiator during the creation of UNASUR (Interviewee 4 2011). 
From the Argentinean perspective, it was important to build up a counterbalance to 
Brazil. ‘Sentía que si la mesa era únicamente entre Brasil y Argentina, la Argentina perdía; 
en cambio sí se triangulaba – y nosotros teníamos tan buena relación con México–  des-
balanceábamos a Brasil,’ said the same diplomat (Interviewee 4 2011). The signing of an 
Argentinean–Mexican strategic partnership agreement in 2007 – which was approved al-
most simultaneously with the negotiations of the Strategic Reflection Committee respon-
sible for the elaboration of a draft for the UNASUR statute and the subsequent inclusion 
of the category of ‘associated states’ in the Constitutive Treaty (which unlocked the gate 
for the future incorporation of other Latin American countries) – reflects the Argentinean 
government’s strategic objective of balancing. 
Domestic–foreign boundaries. The South Americanisation dynamic was progressively 
interfering with the multiaxial profile that had initially been planned for Mercosur. The 
projects of the CSN and subsequently UNASUR coincided with the diffusion of a region-
al integration concept that operated simultaneously on multiple axes. Nevertheless this 
multiaxial approach was constantly undermined by ongoing conflicts over economic and 
trade issues, occurring both internationally and domestically. 
Starting with the international level, as during the 1999–2003 cycle, between 2003 and 
2008 economic and trade conflicts proliferated. Notwithstanding the ‘buena sintonía’ be-
tween Duhalde and Lula, both political leaders were in practice unable to avoid sectorial 
economic pressures (such as from sugar, meat, and wool producers) damaging the rela-
tionship between Buenos Aires and Brasilia. This situation had spillover effects on differ-
ent regional arenas. There was a tendency towards uniaxiality witnessed again throughout 
the years that followed, leading to tensions with, among others, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, 
and Uruguay. This trend was reinforced by debates emerging about the current asymme-
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tries in the Mercosur region, ranging from concerns about commercial and economic top-
ics to geostrategic issues. Even areas where there had been advances made with regard to 
the different countries’ capacities to influence the regional agenda were now questioned. 
The Argentinean–Brazilian bilateralism within Mercosur – as in the time of the Buenos 
Aires Consensus – was criticised by Paraguay and Uruguay because they felt excluded 
from the process of defining Mercosur’s priorities.
It should also be mentioned that the Argentinean government’s position with regard 
to both Mercosur and UNASUR was also influenced by the other international negotia-
tions in which it was concurrently taking part. To take an example, although the Argen-
tinean government still adhered to the formula ‘4+1’6 in international negotiations, at 
different moments its relationships with the countries of the region were affected by these 
dialogues with non-South American actors. Sometimes these negotiations had an integra-
tive impact on Mercosur, sometimes they bolstered centrifugal forces within the organ-
isation. This could be seen not only in the position adopted in the negotiations over the 
FTAA, but also in the negotiations with the EU, the IMF, the World Bank – or even in 
those with India, Japan, and Korea. Thus, on numerous chessboards the ‘X+1’ formula was 
constantly challenged by the ‘1+1’ alternative – as preferred by other states such as Chile.
The disruption caused by external nuisances was reinforced by a number of domestic 
factors and actors too. These included intergovernmental conflicts, as well as the friction 
arising between government sectors and the opposition. One of the key elements that 
needs to be taken into account in order to understand the Kirchner government’s resis-
tance to the South America project is the fact that the latter was directly associated with 
former president Duhalde’s strategy to become a regional leader. Duhalde was a strong 
supporter of Lula (and of Chávez) with regard to the constitution of a CSN. Although 
initially Duhalde received the explicit support of all Mercosur members in heading the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives, the progressive deterioration of his relation-
ship with Kirchner had a direct impact on the Argentinean government’s position with 
regard to the South America project. 
The 2004 Cusco Summit was the most illustrative example of the repercussions of this 
ongoing conflict between Kirchner and Duhalde. From his position in Mercosur, Duhalde 
had been one of the principal promoters of the summit. However, in the end Kirchner did 
not even participate in the event. In order to better understand this dispute, one should 
know that both politicians were in direct confrontation with each other over the control of 
the Justicialist Party. Four years later, meanwhile, the relatively brief stopover of Cristina 
Fernández at the 2008 South American presidential summit, which in the end gave birth 
to UNASUR, must, though, be understood in the context of the severe Argentinean do-
mestic crisis that arose in relation to the controversial tax imposed on the export of certain 
cereals and oilseeds.
Conclusion
With the signature of UNASUR’s Constitutive Treaty in 2008, the Argentinean govern-
ment finally supported the creation of a South American regional organisation. This it did 
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in a period full of new and competing regional projects. UNASUR embodies the idea of 
unity and harmony, but it was born also as a reaction to ongoing conflicts. It can be argued 
that conflict is an incentive for co-operation. At the time when UNASUR was created, 
several subregional conflicts still persisted. These involved variously: Ecuador, Venezuela, 
and Colombia; Argentina and Uruguay; Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil; Paraguay and 
Brazil; Bolivia and Brazil; Chile and Peru; Chile and Bolivia; Guyana and Venezuela; and 
other conflicts that meanwhile confronted Guyana and Suriname. Thus, the creation of 
UNASUR was not an expression of perfect and permanent harmony; its existence does 
not necessarily indicate ideational conformity either. In that sense, when Argentina ac-
ceded to the new regional organisation, it decided to participate in a process that involves 
a plurality of actors with often divergent interests. For instance, countries such as Chile, 
Colombia, and Peru have previously signed free trade agreements with extraregional ac-
tors like the US. In fact, at the time of UNASUR’s inception, the Pacific Alliance already 
existed – but the latter body was then still without a name and a formal structure.
Argentina joined UNASUR by supporting the flexible institutional and ‘utilitarian’ 
(Nelson 2015: 184) model promoted by Brazil, meanwhile discarding the ‘institutional-
izing’ proposal promoted by countries such as Venezuela and Ecuador. Argentinean gov-
ernment representatives perceived the new organisation as an opportunity for advancing 
certain goals regarding the definition of a regional agenda, specifically by exercising intel-
lectual leadership within UNASUR. 
Figure 3: Argentina’s position in regard to the South Americanisation of regional integration 
1999–2008
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
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For the Argentinean government, it was important to ensure that it was not too restric-
tive in its foreign policy. Flexibility, gradualism, and simplicity were the cornerstones of the 
new regional organisation. In the end, UNASUR created a win–win situation for Argentina 
and Brazil. Both the ‘Mercosur ampliado’ option prioritised by Buenos Aires and the South 
American alternative promulgated by Brasilia were based on the notion of ‘no restraints.’ 
The result was the variable geometry codified in the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty. 
UNASUR is a platform that, thanks to its profile and institutional architecture, al-
lows the Argentinean government to define and put into practice its own regional inte-
gration agenda without any major foreign policy restrictions. The institutional design of 
UNASUR guarantees that the Argentinean government can freely develop its relations 
with other regional actors, and regardless of whether they are situated inside or outside 
of South America’s geographical borders. UNASUR thus cannot be understood or studied 
without taking into account the whole regional architecture, both in the Latin American 
and the South American regions.
Mercosur is still the core element of the Argentinean–Brazilian alliance, and the main 
platform for Argentina’s regional strategy in economic, political, and social terms. UN-
ASUR constitutes an additional regional forum in which it is possible to cooperate on other 
issue areas, such as those of defence, infrastructure, health, science and technology, or fi-
nance. Moreover, the whole regional architecture also includes other entities such as OAS, 
the Rio Group (now CELAC), and ALADI. Their importance varies in terms of territorial 
reach and political conjunctures. For instance, for the Argentinean government in 2008, 
the OAS was still perceived as an important multilateral forum for dialogue – one with a 
focus on human rights and the Malvinas dispute – with the US, but also as a political arena 
in which to balance not only against the power of Washington, but also against that of some 
South American partners such as Brazil or Venezuela. Moreover, it is a forum from which 
Mexico is not excluded. To take another example, the Rio Group played an essential role in 
the resolution of the 2008 Ecuador–Colombia–Venezuela crisis. For Argentina, it has been 
important to include allies such as Cuba – which is not part either of UNASUR or of OAS 
– in this regional mechanism of political consultation and coordination. 
This complex regional architecture increases institutional flexibility, and enables Ar-
gentina to act in multiple arenas of dialogue and co-operation. This regional architecture 
encompasses all countries of the Americas, but also smaller regional subunits such as Latin 
America, South America, or the Southern Cone – as well as a broad spectrum of thematic 
axes. The creation of new regional organisations has led to an overlapping of memberships 
in them, and in some cases also of mandates –especially between regional organisations 
with different or overlapping geographic reaches. Whether the overlapping of regional or-
ganisations is harmful or beneficial ultimately depends on what the involved actors make 
out of them. What might be seen as problematic from a purely institutional point of view 
can in fact be an optimal strategic outcome, when taking into account the strategic inter-
ests of the various state actors involved.   
This article has demonstrated that the institutional structure of UNASUR is not the 
result of some distorted design or organisational defect. Nor can one attribute its nature 
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to an insufficient or superficial reading of the textbooks on European integration. Instead, 
it responds to the – sometimes contradictory – interests of the organisation’s designers, in 
this case study, Argentina. UNASUR is not merely another instance of institutional chaos 
or another piece of spaghetti in the bowl, but rather the result of a conscious decision to 
add a further layer to the institutional architecture of South America. It would be fasci-
nating to have available similar case studies on the foreign policy strategies and interests 
of other South American countries in the process of UNASUR’s formation; hopefully the 
literature will furnish us with such works in the near future.
Notes
1 For example, during the summit of the World Trade Organization held between 9 and 14 November 2001 
the Mercosur countries were able to define a common position when they claimed that economically more 
advanced countries should eliminate their subsidies to the agricultural sector.
2 Until then, an economic recession had been affecting Argentina ever since the mid-1990s; in 2001 these 
economic problems evolved into a multidimensional political, social, and cultural crisis. This turn of events 
culminated in the resignation of President De la Rúa, and in the emergence of a temporary power vacuum 
in the country.
3 At that time, the US was a key player in the negotiations taking place with multilateral credit agencies such 
as the IMF or the World Bank.
4 These projects were proposed by Venezuela, with some not being restricted to Mercosur but also involving 
other South American countries.
5 This fieldwork involved conducting 32 interviews with stakeholders and important protagonists from the 
period under analysis. These were realised between 2010 and 2014. Informal meetings with officeholders 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Economy, as well as with 
representatives of nongovernmental organisations, complemented these interviews. 
6 This formula refers to the fact that the four Mercosur member countries have continued to negotiate as a 
block with other states or regional organisations – such as, for example, with the rest of the Americas in the 
FTAA process. 
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